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This thesis investigates whether biological sex and motor function have a role in the 
visual representation of the self. The principal contribution is a new virtual reality experiment 
that systematically varied an avatar’s sex and motion, after which participants recorded 
judgments about the relationship between themselves and the avatar. Virtual reality aims to 
produce the authentic experience of being present or the feeling of being there in an artificial 
environment. The third person perspective is similar to looking at oneself in a mirror but 
different than the first-person perspective, which places the user inside the body of the avatar, 
which are virtual simulated characters that can act as a visual representation of the self.    
The experiment assessed the role of biological sex and self-motion by presenting 
participants with pairs of avatars that visually represent the participant (“self avatar”), or 
another person (“opposite avatar”). Additionally, the avatars’ motion either corresponded to 
the participant’s motion, or was decoupled from the participant’s motion. Decoupled motion 
consisted of swaying slightly from side to side. By manipulating sex and motion, I tested 
whether these aspects affect how participants perceive themselves. The results support the 
conclusion that sex and normal motion both affect the visual representation of the self.  
These results relate to two theories of bodily awareness: the representationalist theory 
and sensorimotor theory. These theories explain how individuals come to have awareness of 
their bodies from the inside. While the representational theory focuses on sensorimotor 
representations, the sensorimotor theory focuses on sensorimotor functions and voluntary 
action. The results relate to the representational theory because sex and motion are both 
relevant to the body schema and body image. Although there is no consensus among 
researchers of their definitions, body schema is generally regarded as an unconscious, bottom-
up, dynamic representation, relying on proprioceptive information from the muscles, joints, 
and skin. On the other hand, the body image is a more conscious, top down, cognitive 
representation, incorporating semantic knowledge of the body, and mostly used to make 
perceptual judgements. The results relate to the sensorimotor approach since motion and 
sensorimotor functions were manipulated. This finding is limited, however, by the fact that 
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What constitutes the sense of self? How does the self relate to the physical world 
around us? Within philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science the sense of self is frequently 
discussed, although it is rarely explicitly defined. Throughout this thesis, I will use the human 
“sense of self” to mean one’s conscious sense (experience or awareness) of personal identity in 
thought, emotion, body, and action. In these disciplines, this construct has been called by 
different names, such as “soul” or “spirit”, or newer psychological terms such as “person”, 
“mind”, or “self.”   
I take an interdisciplinary approach to studying the sense of self, drawing on ideas from 
multiple areas of cognitive science, specifically philosophy and psychology (Gallagher, 2000). 
Researchers in these areas have proposed at least twenty-one distinct notions of the self 
(Strawson, 2004), some of which are complex and multi-faceted. In this thesis, I will not address 
the question of whether there is a single best definition of “self,” nor will I make substantive 
assumptions about the self being “unified” (compare Martin, 2006). Instead, I will simply 
assume that a sense of self involves, at least, conscious awareness of one’s own experiences; 
this is sometimes called “the minimal self” (Zahavi, 1999; see also Northoff, 2014; Blanke and 
Metzinger, 2009). I will also assume that for members of a highly social species, such as 
humans, socially important properties such as personality traits, habits, and biological sex can 
make contributions to one’s sense of self. 
This thesis investigates whether biological sex and motor function have a role in the 
visual representation of the self. Sensorimotor functions are part of humans’ voluntary 
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movement and involve the process of receiving sensory input and producing a motor output. 
For organisms that reproduce sexually, biological sex is a fundamentally important attribute. 
Relevant evidence for evaluating my principal questions comes from a review of existing 
theories and findings, as well as the results of a new virtual reality behavioral experiment. The 
experiment assessed the role of biological sex and self-motion in the visual representation of 
the self by presenting participants with pairs of avatars that visually represent the participant 
(“self avatar”), or another person (“opposite avatar”). Additionally, the avatars’ motion either 
corresponded to the participant’s motion, or was decoupled from the participant’s motion. 
Decoupled motion consisted of swaying slightly from side to side. By manipulating sex and 
motion, I tested whether these aspects affect how participants perceive themselves. The results 
support the conclusion that sex and normal motion both affect the visual representation of the 


















“I’m not myself today, you see,” Alice said to the caterpillar. “I don’t see,” said the caterpillar.  








What constitutes the sense of self?  Two main influential theories are the 
representational theory of bodily awareness (O'Shaughnessy, 1980; Carruthers, 2008; 
Vignemont, 2010) and sensorimotor theory of bodily awareness (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). These 
theories explain how individuals come to have awareness of their bodies from the inside. While 
the representational theory focuses on sensorimotor representations, the sensorimotor theory 
focuses on sensorimotor functions and voluntary action. My proposed contribution to the topic 
is a new virtual reality behavioural experiment which assesses the role of motion and sex to the 
visual representation of the self.  
This thesis has three main sections: a literature review, a new virtual reality behavioural 
experiment, and a conclusion. In section 2, I provide a literature review on the self and sense of 
self, including philosophical and empirical contributions. In section 3, I report a new virtual-
reality behavioral experiment. In section 4, I argue that the experimental results suggest that 
self motion and sex are important to one’s visual self-representation. I also relate the results of 
the experiment to the representational and sensorimotor theories and indicate some 
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2. Literature Review 
 
In this section, I review relevant theories of the self from Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, 
John Locke, David Hume, and Derek Parfit.  
Plato (428-348 B.C.) 
 
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates, the spokesperson for Plato’s views, argues the soul has 
three interacting parts: reason, spirit, and appetite (Shields, 2011). For Socrates, the mortal 
parts of the soul are spirit, which is responsible for emotions, and appetite, which is responsible 
for desires such as hunger and thirst. On the other hand, the soul’s reason is the rational and 
immortal part, which controls the desires. The rational part survives bodily death and is 
separable from the body. This means the body and soul are separate parts of a person. 
Additionally, since Plato divided consciousness into three separate aspects, the self has three 
different locations: the head, heart, and gut. For Plato, then, the soul is the source for the sense 
of self.  
Plato views the body as separate from the conscious soul. For Plato, the soul is a 
helpless prisoner, chained hand and foot in the body and views reality only through its prison 
bars (Shields, 2011). This illustrates Plato’s dualism: that the soul and body are separate 
entities. Since the conscious soul is separate from the body and the conscious soul is supreme 
over the body, the body does not play a part in self-motion.   
Moreover, for Plato, since the body is given a lower status to the soul, there is a 
hierarchy of reason over the senses:  
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Don’t you think that the person who is likely to succeed in this attempt [to reach the 
goal of reality] most perfectly is the one who approaches each object, as far as possible, 
with the unaided intellect, without taking account of any sense of sight in his thinking, 
or dragging any other sense into his reckoning—the man who pursues the truth by 
applying his pure and unadulterated thought to the pure and unadulterated object, 
cutting himself off as much as possible from his eyes and ears and virtually all the rest of 
his body, as an impediment which by its presence prevents the soul from attaining to 
truth and clear thinking? Is not this the person, Simmias, who will reach the goal of 
reality, if anybody can? What you say is absolutely true, Socrates, said Simmias. (Reale 
1987, p.50) 
On Plato’s account, it seems that the conscious soul is cut off from the senses, motor control, 
and the rest of the body, because they are not needed for the understanding of the good. It 
seems under Plato’s account, then, that motion or the movement of the body has a lower 
status than the rational mind’s intention for motion. 
Aristotle (384 -322 B.C.E) 
 
 Unlike Plato, Aristotle was concerned with the soul’s relationship to the body and 
human nature. Aristotle opposed Plato’s dualism and advocated instead for materialism. On 
Aristotle’s view, all living things have souls, the vital principle of life, which animate the body 
and account for it being alive. For Aristotle, then, souls are not a body but require a body. In 
effect, although these two entities are distinguished conceptually, the body and soul are 
interdependent and inseparable.  
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In contrast to Plato, Aristotle argued for three different levels of the soul: nutritive, 
sensitive, and intellectual (Aristotle et al. 1995). At the bottom level, the nutritive soul is found 
in plants and is responsible for growth, nourishment, and reproduction. The next higher level is 
the sensitive soul, which is in non-human animals and has the same powers as the nutritive soul 
plus locomotion and perception, which are sensorimotor functions. The top level is the 
intellectual soul, which is found only in humans. It has the same powers of the vegetative and 
sensitive souls plus nous, which is responsible for thought. For Aristotle, then, the intellectual 
soul is responsible for motion. Thus, Aristotle gives sensorimotor function a more important 
role in the human self than Plato did. Further, unlike Plato, Aristotle discussed and ranked all 
five senses: sight is superior to touch, hearing, and smell to taste (Smith, 2007). This suggests 
that Aristotle appreciated that sensorimotor function was important for humans’ sense of self.  
In De Partibus Animalium, Aristotle argues that the self is in the heart. Call this the 
cardiocentric model. For Aristotle, “nature, when no other more important purpose stands in 
her way, places the more honourable part in the more honourable position; and the heart lies 
about the centre of the body, but rather in its upper than its lower half and also more in front 
than behind” (Aristotle 1882, p.67). Aristotle held this view because he noticed the heart was 
the first developed organ in stillborn embryos, which, on his interpretation, implied that it was 
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René Descartes (1596-1650) 
 
French rationalist philosopher Descartes agrees with Plato that the soul is separable 
from the body, that the self is not the body, and could exist even if the body did not. The 
relation between one’s self and the world encompasses the relation between one’s self and 
one’s body. In his Sixth Meditation, Descartes argues that one’s self is not located in one’s body 
as a pilot within a ship, but instead is “very closely joined” and “intermingled” with it, so that 
the two “form a unit” (Descartes 1988, p.116). On Descartes’s view, the mind and body interact 
in ways that make the two of them function as if they were one. For Descartes, the self and 
body are two separate entities.  
Under Descartes account, although the mind or soul cannot be localized into a specific 
part of the body, the causal connection between the two substances functions through the 
brain, and specifically in the pineal gland. For Descartes, the pineal gland is a possible place for 
a channel between the brain and soul since it is in the centre of the brain, which makes it ideal 
for controlling sensorimotor functions. For Descartes there is a two-way causal interaction 
between the soul and brain:  
the fluids in the brain ventricles mediate the messages between the body, brain, and the 
soul. Vibrations of the pineal were believed to be transformed into vibrations of the 
fluids in the third ventricle, which were then conducted to the muscles as commands to 
move the extremities. Nerves were believed to be hollow tubes…that mediate distance 
causal effects to the muscles through changes of hydraulic pressure in the nerves. 
Stimulation of the sensory nerves…was believed to be conducted to the brain, to be 
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transformed into vibration of the fluids in the ventricles and thereby communicated to 
the pineal, which forwarded them to the soul. (Revonsuo, 2010, p.8) 
Under Descartes’ account, then, sensorimotor functions do not seem to have a role in 
constituting the self or soul. Instead, the two- way connection between the brain and soul 
seems to enable sensorimotor functions.  
Personal Identity 
 
Personal identity is concerned with what makes the self the same self despite 
psychological and physical changes that a person undergoes over a lifetime. For John Locke 
(1632-1704), even if one does believe in souls, they are not relevant to the problem of personal 
identity. Moreover, if one identifies one’s self with one’s soul, then the same soul could be 
connected at different times to different bodies. Instead of identifying the self with an 
immaterial soul, Locke argues personal identity is a matter of consciousness, and, specifically, 
memory:  
For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every 
one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking 
things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and 
as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, 
so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by 
the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. 
The existence of a soul, therefore, is simply otiose in the context of personal identity: . . 
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. I who write this am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the 
same substance, material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. (Locke, p.222)  
What makes the self the same over time, then, is the persistence of memory.  
David Hume (1711-1776) agreed with Locke that memory is important but only because 
it creates the illusion of selfhood. Hume argues that all that we can know derives from 
impressions or ideas of those experiences. For Hume:  
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on 
some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain 
or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time with a perception, and never can 
observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, 
as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may be truly said not to exist. 
(Hume, p.252)   
For Hume, then, selves are just collections of mental states, such as memories, intentions, 
desires, and hopes.   
Derek Parfit (1942-2017) follows Hume but defends his position by considering science 
fiction thought experiments. In Parfit’s first thought experiment, an individual’s brain is 
transplanted into a different body. Despite the change in body, this new individual, composed 
of the original individual’s brain and the new body, seems to retain the original individual’s 
personal identity. In Parfit’s second thought experiment, half of an individual’s brain is 
destroyed, but this individual’s memories and character persist in the intact hemisphere. This 
intact hemisphere is transplanted into a new body with memories and character unchanged. 
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Again, Parfit argues that this new individual, with the intact hemisphere and new body, still 
seems to retain the original individual’s personal identity (Parfit, 1986).  
In Parfit’s third thought experiment, both hemispheres are intact and can support the 
individual’s mental states. Each hemisphere is transplanted separately into a new body, yielding 
two new individuals. For Parfit, there are three possible interpretations of this thought 
experiment, but none are satisfactory (Parfit, 1986). The first interpretation is that the original 
individual is neither of the new individuals and does not survive. The second interpretation is 
that the original individual survives as one of the new individuals. But if the two hemispheres 
are psychologically identical, then there is no principled reason to argue this. The third 
interpretation is that the original individual survives as both. But, Parfit argues, the two new 
individuals would live their own lives and become different individuals. The view that the 
original individual survives as both seems incorrect if these new individuals are so different. Like 
Hume, Parfit argues that personal identity is incoherent and that there is nothing more than 
our mental states that make us who we are (Parfit, 1986).  
However, although there is concern about the existence of the self and personal 
identity, cognitive scientists and philosophers also investigate the related question of what 
constitutes the sense of self, one’s conscious sense of personal identity in thought, body, 
action, and emotion. I turn to some of this research next.  
The Sense of Agency and Sense of Ownership 
 
From a phenomenological perspective, human experience has a conscious subject of 
experience with a sense of one’s own experience from the first-person perspective—
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the content of one’s current field of experience (Strawson, 2004). This self intuitively pervades 
conscious experience and appears to be directly available to a person through introspection. 
Moreover, ‘I’ seem to be in direct contact with the self and at the same time, ‘I’ am the self. 
This contrasts with the publicly observable self, which, to others, appears as a particular human 
being with a complex biological and social history and name.    
The minimal self is a basic, immediate, or primitive something that we are willing to call 
a self (Gallagher, 2000), and thus enables us to capture the most primitive sense of self. 
Moreover, this immediate something is self-consciousness as an immediate subject of 
experience and linked to the first-person perspective. The minimal self is also a non-conceptual 
and pre-reflective point of origin for action, experience, thought, and knowledge about what is 
identifiable with the pronoun ‘I.’ This latter aspect means we cannot make a mistake about the 
person to whom we are referring—an observation known as the immunity principle (Gallagher, 
2000). 
An important feature of the minimal self is that it is not always experienced as 
temporally continuous. As one researcher put it, “the minimal self describes a basic sense of 
self at any given moment in time, but does not yet provide a link between moments in time and 
thus continuity across time” (Northoff 2014, p.455). For instance, humans’ flow of 
consciousness seems to consist of a series of unrelated selves, like a string of pearls. It is a self 
without history— a bare locus of consciousness, void of personality and temporal continuity 
(Strawson, 2004). To say that what underlies the sense of self is a minimal self that does not 
contribute to personal identity may seem counterintuitive since one’s self seems unified and 
continuously present. But, it does not seem to be the case that being continuously present is a 
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necessary condition for all features that constitute the self. Further, either having one 
continuous self or a series of unrelated selves seems to get the same effect— the feeling of a 
sense of self.  
Recent research on the sensorimotor basis of the minimal self distinguishes two key 
aspects: the sense of agency and sense of ownership (Gallagher, 2000). The sense of ownership 
is the awareness that I am the one who is undergoing an experience (Cebolla et al. 2016). The 
sense of ownership depends on an accurate integration of continuously changing body-related 
multisensory information (Gallagher, 2000). Multisensory integration of bodily signals refers to 
the brain’s capacity to combine information from different sensory modalities to provide stable 
and coherent perception of the body and its surrounding. Sensory inputs are weighed and 
integrated based on their reliability, and a source of sensory input which varies the least is the 
most reliable source of information (Holmes and Spence, 2005). Typically, vision is the most 
reliable source of information due to its high spatial resolution.  
 The sense of agency is the awareness that I am the one who is the initiator or source of 
the action (Cebolla et al. 2016). The sense of agency enables individuals to distinguish self-
generated actions from actions produced by another agent. The most basic sense of agency 
originates from sensorimotor processes, since it depends on a causal link between an action 
and the sensory consequences of that action (Synofzik et al, 2008).  
The sense of ownership and the sense of agency are first-order, phenomenological 
(nonconceptual) aspects of experience, pre-reflectively implicit in action. In normal experience 
of voluntary or willed action, sense of agency and sense of ownership coincide and are 
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indistinguishable. In the case of involuntary movement, however, it is possible to distinguish 
these two senses (Gallagher, 2000). The growing consensus on this division between sense of 
agency and sense of ownership is that the sense of agency for action is based on that which 
precedes action and translates intention into action, while sense of ownership for motor action 
can be explained in terms of ecological self-awareness built into movement and perception 
(Gallagher, 2000).   
There are two approaches to explain the existence of the sense of agency and 
ownership, and both include two “different forms of bodily self-representation: feeling 
(perceptual representation of body) and judgment (propositional representation of the body)” 
(Balconi 2010, p.176). The bottom-up approach requires higher-order conceptually informed 
attributions of ownership and agency to be dependent on first-order experiences. The 
attribution of ownership is the reflective ascription of a certain action to myself. The attribution 
of agency is the reflective ascription that I am the cause or author of a certain action. This 
approach starts at the level of experience and two separable modalities of experience: a sense 
of ownership and a sense of agency (Gallagher, 2000).  
In contrast, the top-down approach requires that the sense occurs only if there is the 
attribution. For instance, an individual’s sense of agency depends on whether they attribute a 
specific action to themselves. This approach requires a higher-order distinction where 
ownership and agency should be primarily thought of as attributions based on a reflective 
acknowledgment (Stephens and Graham, 1994).    
 





Embodiment is important for the conscious experience of the self. It requires body 
ownership (the experience of owning my body), self-location (the experience of where ‘I’ am in 
space), and first-person perspective (the experience from where ‘I’ perceive the world) (Blanke 
and Metzinger, 2009). It involves the ability to pay attention to ourselves, to feel our sensations 
and movements, in the present moment, without the mediating influence of judgmental 
thoughts. Embodiment is part of embodied self-awareness—the centering of our subjective 
experience in our physical bodies—that senses that our body belongs to us and to no one else. 
Embodied self-awareness is different than conceptual self-awareness or thinking about oneself 
(Table 1).   
Embodiment has a role in how humans perceive themselves from a first-person visual 
perspective and third-person visual perspective (Jenkinson et al, 2013). In contrast to viewing 
the body directly from a first-person visual perspective, perceiving the body in a mirror creates 
visual feedback of ourselves from a third-person perspective (Vogeley & Fink, 2003). In humans, 
embodiment and the sense of agency enables self-recognition. For instance, to recognise 
oneself in a mirror requires one to recognise the equivalence between the movement of the 
image and the movement of one’s body (Povinelli, 2001). One must recognise that what is true 
of one’s body is also true of one’s mirror image. This would be done by comparing movement 
of one’s body to that of the mirror image (Povinelli, p. 84–85). The subject must also recognise 
that the body that moves is his own, that it is the body he is bounded in, and the movements 
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that he controls are reflected in the mirror (Carruthers, 2007). Both the sense of ownership and 
embodiment, then, have a role in self-recognition.  
Table 1: Two Kinds of Self-Awareness 
 
 
Conceptual Self-Awareness Embodied Self-Awareness 
Based in linguistic and symbolic Based in sensing, feeling, and acting 
forms of expressions   
Rational, logical, explanatory 
Spontaneous, creative, open to 
change 
Abstract, transcends the present moment 
Concrete, lived in the present 
moment 
Source: Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991) 
 
 
Researchers study embodiment by studying how the brain represents the body and how 
this representation is altered under certain neurological conditions (Lenggenhager et al. 2006; 
Metzinger, 2009). When embodied self-awareness is disrupted, the body is brought to the 
foreground of consciousness and one realizes the complexity and the richness of the experience 
of one’s body. This is disembodiment or the feeling of being detached from oneself and one’s 
actions, as if in a third-person perspective or without any perspective at all. For example, 
vestibular disorder patients, individuals with a discrepancy between vestibular and other body-
related signals, experience deficiencies in how the brain represents the body since their sensory 
input has been compromised. This disunity of self and body creates the feeling and thought of 
disembodiment. In one study, Grigsby and Johnston (1989) collected depersonalization 
experiences in vestibular disorder patients. Within this data, one patient described 
depersonalization as “a sense of unreality” and claimed “I feel like I’m outside of myself. I feel 
like I’m not in myself” (p. 531). Another patient reported “I am not actually being there or 
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having anything to do with my body” (p. 532). Three aspects mark depersonalization: a feeling 
of disturbed bodily subjectivity; a diminishment of affective feeling; and a corresponding and 
overarching sense of unreality, which carries with it a sense of estrangement or alienation 
(Sierra, 2009). The result is a deterioration of the experience of the body and surroundings. 
Theories of Bodily Awareness 
 
There are two main approaches to first-personal bodily awareness: the 
representationalist approach and the sensorimotor approach. A major difference between 
these approaches is that whereas the representationalist approach is mainly anchored in 
analytic philosophy and posits mental representation(s) of the body for the core of bodily 
awareness, the sensorimotor approach is mainly anchored in the phenomenological tradition 
and highlights the importance of interacting with the world. 
Sources of Bodily Awareness 
 
  Humans perceive their bodies not only from the outside, such as looking at one’s arm, 
but also from the inside, such as proprioceptive awareness of one’s arm being raised. This 
distinction is often reduced to the dichotomy between external senses and body senses, which 
include touch, proprioception, and the vestibular, nociceptive and interoceptive systems 
(Blanke, 2012). Cutaneous mechanoreceptors mediate touch by carrying information both 
about the external world and about the body. Proprioception provides information about the 
position and movement of the body. The vestibular system provides information about the 
balance of the body. Nociceptors respond to intense mechanical stimuli, to mechanothermal 
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stimuli or to thermal and chemical stimuli. Interoception provides information about the 
physiological condition of the body to maintain optimal homeostasis.   
At the cortical level, tactile, proprioceptive, and nociceptive signals are processed in the 
primary and secondary somatosensory cortex. Wilder Penfield and Edwin Boldrey found that 
the sensorimotor cortex is topographically organized—areas of the body map onto cortex 
areas, resulting in an anatomical reconstruction of the human body in the brain (Penfield and 
Boldrey, 1937). The primary somatosensory area does not represent the anatomical contiguity 
of body parts. For instance, the hand area is next to the face area. Additionally, some body 
parts are over-represented, whereas others are under-represented. For instance, a relatively 
large cortical area responds to hand-related signals and a relatively small cortical area responds 
to torso-related signals. The size of the brain’s representation is proportional to the sensitivity 
in the primary somatosensory cortex and dexterity in the primary motor cortex of the 
represented area. For instance, the somatosensory representation of the thumb is as large as 
the leg since the skin on the thumb is densely populated by cutaneous receptors, creating a 
high degree of sensitivity and large cortical representation (Penfield and Boldrey, 1937).  
The problem with this view, however, is that these representations are mostly only 
through touch or sensations on the skin. Although these representations allow humans to feel 
their bodies and move through space, they are insufficient to describe the maps of bodily 
representation. Instead, the stronger embodiment mechanisms are in the posterior parietal 
cortex, which integrates the body senses. For instance, body representation and embodiment 
do not only include the body space but also the area immediately around the body, such as 
close visual stimuli and close sounds which are massively integrated (Blanke and Metzinger, 
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2009). Moreover, bodily representation involves integration of self-related signals across visual, 
auditory, somatosensory, vestibular and interoceptive domains underlie the feeling of being a 
self in normal conscious experience.  
Representationalist Theory of Bodily Awareness 
 
Proponents of the representationalist approach claim that to account for bodily 
awareness one needs to appeal to representations of the body, which are internal structures 
that have the function to track the state of the body and encode it, that can misrepresent it, 
and that can be decoupled from it. There are at least two main models of bodily representation. 
One is a dual model of body representation distinguishing the body image and the body schema 
(Gallagher and Cole 1995; Dijkerman and De Haan 2007), or short-term and long-term body 
representations (Carruthers 2008). The second is triadic model of body representation that 
makes a distinction between a visuo-spatial body map and body semantics within the body 
image, in addition to the body schema (Schwoebel and Coslett 2005). 
The current most commonly used classification between different body representations 
is that of body schema and body image. Although there is no consensus among researchers of 
their definitions, body schema is generally regarded as an unconscious, bottom-up, dynamic 
representation, relying on proprioceptive information from the muscles, joints, and skin. It is 
thought to be used to govern posture and motor actions. On the other hand, the body image is 
a more conscious, top down, cognitive representation, incorporating semantic knowledge of 
the body, and mostly used to make perceptual judgements (Paillard, 1999). Moreover, body 
image “refers to a conscious, essentially visual, representation of the body in its canonical 
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position and, with the sort of structural and semantic detail that is familiar from seeing oneself 
in the mirror” (Longo et al. 2008, p.1181-1182). For instance, biological sex can refer to the 
body image. The sex organs, however, are also represented in the body schema.  
Moreover, neuropsychological studies have provided evidence for the dissociation 
between at least two body representations: one which is used during motor action, or body 
schema, and one underlying perceptual judgement, or body image. This dissociation is largely 
based on neurological patients with numbsense who are unable to perceive proprioceptive and 
tactile stimuli but are nevertheless able to point to these targets (Paillard, 1999), and patients 
with autotopagnosia who are impaired in localizing perceptually different body parts, but 
remain able to guide their actions (Buxbaum & Coslett, 2001).   
Under the dual model of body representation, there are two main taxonomies: the 
temporal dyadic and functional dyadic. The temporal dyadic taxonomy (O'Shaughnessy, 1980; 
Carruthers, 2008) is based on the dynamics of body representations. One can contrast the 
representation of long-term bodily properties, such as limb size and the representation of 
short-term bodily properties, such as limb posture. Long-term body representations are 
relatively stable. They may include some innate components that carry information about the 
structure of the human body, such as having two arms. On the other hand, short-term body 
representations are constantly updated based on afferent and efferent information.   
The functional dyadic taxonomy (Paillard, 1999; Dijkerman and de Haan, 2007; 
Vignemont, 2010) is based on the functional role played by each body representations. The 
underlying assumption is that the way one uses information about the body determines the 
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way the information is encoded. Under this approach, the body schema is used for action 
planning and action control. It consists in sensorimotor representations of bodily properties 
that are relevant for action. On the other hand, the body image groups all the other 
representations about the body that are not used for action, whether they are perceptual, 
conceptual, or emotional (Gallagher, 1995). For instance, changes in one’s physical bodily 
structure occurs during development and because of diet, exercise, or trauma. Body 
representation thus requires some degree of plasticity so that changes in actual bodily form can 
be mirrored by corresponding changes in both the brain’s maps of somatosensory inputs and in 
the conscious body image.  
These models of body representations, however, encounter a conceptual problem when 
tested experimentally. The distinctions between body representations are often made on a 
single dimension, such as temporal dynamicity (O’Shaughnessy 1995) or functional role (Paillard 
1999). Depending on the criterion, different distinctions are possible, leading to widespread 
confusion (de Vignemont 2007). Even more importantly, there are more dimensions on which 
body representations can be dissociated than the ones highlighted above. For example, the 
body schema probably includes short-term information (e.g., body posture) as well as long-
term information (e.g., the size of the limbs). 
Another problem is the nature of the evidence that current models of body 
representations rely upon. Since there is disagreement on the number and definitions of body 
representations, there is also disagreement on the classification of bodily disorders. Moreover, 
these taxonomies result in opposite interpretations of the same bodily disorders. For instance, 
personal neglect, the lack of exploration of half of the body, has been interpreted as resulting 
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from a deficit of body schema (Coslett, 1998) and from a deficit of body image (Gallagher, 
1995). Furthermore, although most taxonomies rely on neuropsychological dissociations, it 
does not seem likely that they can account for all bodily disorders.  
Sensorimotor Theory of Bodily Awareness 
 
Under the sensorimotor approach, instead of mental and cognitive representations of 
the body and outside world, the main feature of bodily awareness is actively interacting with 
the world. For Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), there are three main claims to the 
sensorimotor approach: the body is not an object that can be represented, the presence of the 
body is the presence of the body in the world, and the body we experience is the body in action 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962).  
Merleau-Ponty is concerned with characterizing agency and bodily awareness from the 
perspective of the experiencing subject, which is primarily a living body. For Merleau-Ponty, 
there is a discontinuity between experienced spatiality of the physical world or the objective 
body, and the experienced spatiality of the body humans experience from the inside or the 
lived body. The objective body is the body made of muscles, bones, and nerves, whereas the 
lived body is the body that humans experience in pre-reflective awareness. Merleau-Ponty 
argues that the lived body is not an object that can be perceived from various perspectives or 
localized in objective space. Instead, the lived body is the site of the first-person perspective, 
the manifestation of the minimal self.  
In effect, one’s experience is enabled and structured through a body that is always 
there, and hence the body is not just part of the physical world, but also the vehicle that 
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enables being a self in this world (Merleau-Ponty, 1962). One’s self is not merely embodied, but 
bodily: “But I am not in front of my body, I am in my body, or rather I am my body” (Merleau-
Ponty 1962, p. 150). Merleau-Ponty, however, does not argue that the self is a complex physical 
object. Instead, the self is a bodily or physical subject. Merleau-Ponty, then, rejects the 
traditional relation of mind and body and the ontologies of dualism, materialism, and idealism.  
Under the sensorimotor approach, then, humans are “sensorimotor beings [and] the 
environment that emerges…is a sensorimotor world of perception, action, and emotional 
significance” (Maisse 2010, p.19). The lived world presents itself as a field of certain 
possibilities, opportunities, or obstacles. The lived body lets humans interact with the world via 
perception and action since it is a space of actions endowed with ways of existing towards 
objects. The self’s role, then, is to navigate the world and this is partly due to sensorimotor 
functions that allow one to engage and experience one’s surroundings. 
Sensorimotor Theory and Body Schema and Image  
 
Merleau-Ponty introduces body image to explain the dynamic of motility (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962). Moreover, Merleau-Ponty argues that through body image humans get a total 
awareness of their position in the inter-sensory world. Our body-image or body-space is to be 
understood as a background to our practical capacity to organize our bodily movements. On the 
other hand, Merleau-Ponty argues that the body schema is our primary way of being in the 
world is not reflexive or intellectual but bodily. The body provides sensorimotor functions, and 
how they relate and link us to the world. Since we operate in the world using sensorimotor 
functions, we are always connected to the environment as a being-in-the-world. The body’s 
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sensorimotor functions, then, have an imperative role in being a being-in-the-world since they 
allow humans to perceive the world through sensory functions and act upon the world using 
motor functions.  
Current phenomenology also articulates the difference between body schema and body 
image on two points: “1. The body schema consists of (mostly) non-conscious processes that 
regulate posture and movement. The body image, on the other hand, is a (conscious) 
representation of the own body. It consists of perceptual, cognitive and/or emotional 
representations. 2. The body schema refers to the possibility to move, the body image to the 
capacity to reflect” (Preester, p.259). Moreover, schemas are representations or an 
unconscious functional sensorimotor map of the body that provides the essential information 
needed to move one’s own body. These sensorimotor processes unconsciously organize 
perception and action, so an individual can move around the world and focus their energy and 
attention elsewhere. 
Under the sensorimotor approach, then, the body’s sensorimotor functions that link the 
body with the environment yield and constitute the minimal self and the first-person 
perspective. This means that the minimal self is embodied and embedded—integrated in both 
body and environment. Moreover, minimal selfhood emerges from this experience of a unified, 
situated living body as a “sensorimotor unity anchored to its world” (Legrand, 2006). In effect, 
the self is a locative system, organised with parts and functions and the sense of self is 
conditioned by one’s embodiment, physicality, and the organization of the locative system. For 
our purposes, then, the sensorimotor functions of the minimal self, which is attached to 
embodied conscious beings, partially constitutes the sense of self at the level of experience.   





Section 2 has highlighted the relevant literature on the self and sense of self.  Since 
there are numerous definitions of the self, researchers use the minimal self to empirically study 
its aspects—agency and ownership—to learn about embodiment and the sense of self. There 
are also two approaches to bodily awareness: the representational approach and sensorimotor 
approach and both theories relate to the body schema and body image.  
In the next section, I will first describe some of the current bodily self-consciousness 
experiments, such as body part and whole-body. I will then detail the methods, hypothesis, 
procedure, and results of our new virtual reality behavioral experiment that researches the role 
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3. Researching the Sense of Self   
 
To empirically investigate the sense of self, researchers use bodily self-consciousness, 
which is a complex mental construct linked to the strong sense that we recognize that our body 
belongs to us, our conscious self is housed within our physical body in a first-person 
perspective, and our body inhabits a specific physical location in external space (Aglioti and 
Candidi, 2011). Moreover, bodily self-consciousness is the feeling of being a subject in a body or 
awareness of the body and its link to neural body representations. The most fruitful trend in 
contemporary research is investigating the components of bodily self-consciousness, 
embodiment and the sense of agency, and their relative impairments (Blanke and Metzinger, 
2009). Experiments on embodiment and the sense of agency shed light on the components and 
mechanisms that structure the sense of self since disembodiment and the loss of the sense of 
agency can lead to the disruption of the sense of self (Blanke and Metzinger 2009; see also 
Lopez et al 2008).  
Bodily self-consciousness experiments separate three self-referential components of 
ordinary conscious experience or embodiment: body ownership (the experience of owning my 
body), self-location (the experience of where ‘I’ am in space), and first-person perspective (the 
experience from where ‘I’ perceive the world) (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). Researchers have 
developed approaches to investigate these separate components of bodily self-consciousness 
by inducing bodily illusions through the presentation of conflicting sensory information 
regarding one’s own body. These studies research healthy participants and individuals with 
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altered states of bodily self-consciousness by using experimental paradigms, such as virtual 
reality, to manipulate and control its components.  
Experimental Manipulations on the Sense of Agency 
 
Many studies have introduced a sensorimotor mismatch between action and outcome 
to study the sense of agency. This operationalization draws upon the forward model of motor 
control and the notion of efference copies as predictors of movement outcome. If a sensory 
event does not match the movement, or if the predicted and actual outcome do not 
correspond, the event is attributed to another person or source rather than to oneself (Synofzik 
et al 2008). For instance, in some studies, participants perform simple movements, such as 
finger movements (David et al, 2008), or more complex movements, such as line drawing 
(Nielsen, 1963), moving a joystick (Franck et al 2001), or button presses (Blakemore et al, 1998), 
while participants’ sensory feedback is manipulated. In one experiment, a subject drew a line 
with a pencil, while the provided visual feedback was either the subject’s own hand or the 
experimenter’s hand, which drew a spatially deviated line (Nielsen, 1963). The subjects were 
unaware that they were adjusting their movements to the false feedback, but only to a certain 
degree of deviation, when they recognized that it was not themselves who drew the line 
(Nielsen, 1963). Studying bodily agency in experiments, then, is important for bodily self-
consciousness research since it confirms what components and mechanisms are required for an 
individual to have a normal sense of self.    
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Experimental Manipulations of Body Ownership 
 
Presenting conflicting multisensory information about the location and appearance of 
one’s body or body parts can temporally modify the sense of body ownership. One major study 
in multisensory body representation research is the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI), which puts into 
conflict that when humans see and feel the touch in a certain position it should come from the 
same position in space (Ehrsson et al. 2005). In this illusion, this is not the case. The maps are 
activated on the vision of the rubber hand, but participants feel the strokes on the actual hand. 
Since these integration maps cannot work properly, the brain dissociates these two senses.  
The RHI critically depends on synchronous stroking of the hands. To induce the illusion, 
one researcher strokes the middle finger of the participant’s real hand while simultaneously 
strokes the same finger on the rubber hand. In combining the visual information with the touch 
sensations, the brain mistakenly concludes that the rubber hand must be part of the person’s 
body. Synchronous touches onto a visible rubber hand and onto the hidden participants’ hand 
produce the compelling feeling of ownership of the fake hand.  
The illusion is induced due to the dominant role of vision over the proprioceptive 
signals, and results in the self-attribution of the rubber hand and referral of touch to the rubber 
hand. The illusion, however, breaks down when there is ~200ms synchrony between brushes 
occurs (Ehrsson et al. 2005). This experiment suggests that self-recognition depends in part on 
one’s sense of what is one’s body, a component of the sense of embodiment. This experiment 
also shows the pivotal role played by multisensory mechanisms in body representation since 
multisensory stimulation induces a sense of ownership over a fake limb. 
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Different studies on RHI also suggest that multisensory integration is the crucial 
mechanism for the experience of our body as our own. For instance, multiple versions of the 
RHI have examined how different physical and spatial features of the rubber hand influence the 
illusion. While the similarity of physical features of an embodied artificial limb and the real limb 
does aid self-attribution, subjects are able to embody limbs with different physical features. For 
instance, it has been shown that color does not determine embodiment of an artificial limb 
(Longo et al. 2009). Regarding size, it has been shown that a rubber hand larger than one's real 
hand (Pavani and Zampini, 2007) and longer arms (Kilteni et al., 2012) can be embodied by 
subjects. Other researchers found that the illusion could be induced in the mirror, and with no 
difference in the strength of the illusion when viewing the rubber hand directly or in the mirror 
(Jenkinson et al, 2013). It is likely that, given our life-long exposure to mirrors, mirror-based 
visual information about the body can be readily transformed to egocentric coordinates and 
combined with other bodily signals in personal and peripersonal space (Jenkinson et al, 2013).   
The self, however, is experienced as a single, coherent whole-body representation 
rather than as multiple representations of separate body parts. Although the RHI paradigm has 
accumulated important knowledge about the brain mechanisms underlying the sense of body 
ownership, induction of the full body illusions has shown to be important to investigate global 
bodily self-consciousness. Studies on the RHI thus investigate only body part ownership or the 
attribution and localization of a body part with respect to the global bodily self, that is, a part-
to-whole relationship. Accordingly, these studies did not investigate global bodily self-
consciousness, namely localization and attribution of the whole-body to which the selected 
body part is attributed (Lopez et al. 2008). The aspects of global ownership, self-location, and 
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first-person perspective are central to the representation of the self as an unitary and coherent 
whole and not only a sum of body parts.  
Body Ownership and Clinical Conditions 
 
  The partial or global sense of body ownership may be disturbed in various neurological 
conditions (Critchley, 1950). Disturbances affecting the partial sense of body ownership can be 
observed in patients suffering from somatoparaphrenia. These patients manifest the delusion 
of disowning their left-sided body parts, most often their hand and arm due to the brain 
damage of the right parieto-temporal and insular regions (Vallar and Ronchi, 2009). 
Disturbances affecting the global sense of body ownership can be observed in autoscopic 
phenomena—illusory own body perceptions that affect the whole body, such as autoscopic 
hallucination and out-of-body experiences (Blanke and Mohr, 2005). In autoscopic 
hallucination, patients see their own body in extrapersonal space, as in a mirror, but they 
perceive themselves to be located within their physical body. The sense of self-location and 
first-person perspective, then, remain intact.   
Patients suffering from out-of-body experiences of neurological origin experience 
themselves as located outside their own bodily boundaries, and report looking at their real 
body from an elevated perspective in extrapersonal space or abnormal first-person perspective 
(Irwin, 1985; Blanke et al. 2004). In out-of-body experiences, there is extracorporeal self-
location or disembodiment since the individual is localized outside their body; there is 
extracorporeal first-person perspective since they perceive their body from a disembodied 
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perspective; and there is self-identification with the elevated body. This is the key distortion to 
an out-of-body experience, since the self is not experienced within the usual body.   
Investigations into the neural correlates of out-of-body experiences provide insights on 
the multisensory nature of self-consciousness and the loss of a sense of self. For instance, in 
out-of-body experiences, self-location and first-person perspectives are abnormal in 
neurological patients and can be manipulated experimentally in healthy subjects by imposing 
multi-sensory conflicts. These components rely on the multisensory integration of 
spatiotemporally congruent exteroceptive (mainly visual), somatosensory (tactile and 
proprioceptive), interoceptive and vestibular signals. Clinical studies showed that out-of-body 
experiences are linked to dysfunctions of the temporo-parietal junction (Blanke et al. 2004; 
Blanke and Mohr, 2005). Furthermore, electrical stimulation of the TPJ induces similar 
experiences to out-of-body experiences (Penfield, 1955; De Ridder et al. 2007). Based on these 
findings, an association between TPJ dysfunction and out-of-body experiences has been 
proposed (Blanke and Mohr, 2005; De Ridder et al. 2007). Studying bodily ownership in certain 
clinical conditions, then, is important for bodily self-consciousness research since it confirms 
what components and mechanisms are required for an individual to have a normal sense of 
self.    
Experimental Manipulations of Body Ownership: Whole-Body and Virtual Reality 
 
Advances in virtual reality systems, together with the reduction in cost of associated 
equipment, have led scientists to consider virtual reality as a useful tool for conducting 
experimental studies in fields such as neuroscience and experimental psychology. In virtual 
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reality, it is possible to replace the participant’s body with a virtual body seen from a first-
person perspective and third person perspective, enabling a wide variety of experiments 
concerned with how the brain represents the body (Blanke, 2012) that could not be realized 
without virtual reality. The third person perspective is similar to looking at oneself in a mirror 
but different from the first-person perspective, which places the user inside the body of the 
avatar, which are virtual simulated characters that can act as a visual representation of the self. 
This mirror view of the body is subject to several unusual properties (Gregory, 1997), one being 
that the mirror image is left-right reversed, such that the left side of the body is located on the 
left side of the mirror space. In addition, the image of the body is observed in a location that is 
distant to the physical location of the body.  
Virtual reality aims to produce the authentic experience of being present in an artificial 
environment termed “presence”, which is the feeling of being there (Grimshaw, 2014). The 
basic function of presence is to allow individuals to differentiate between the internal (the self) 
and the external (the world). Moreover, presence produces a “sense of agency and control: 
subjects are “present” if they feel themselves able to enact their intentions in an external 
world” (Grimshaw 2014, p.206). Self-presence, then, is a psychological state in which virtual 
selves are experienced as the self in either sensory or non-sensory ways. Moreover, it is the 
feeling that not only is one’s avatar a mechanism to interact with the virtual environment, but 
also an extension of the self. 
In one virtual reality whole-body illusion, the bodily self is projected to a virtual avatar 
(Blanke and Metzinger, 2009). This is like the RHI, but instead of having a visual stimulus on the 
hand at a different location, researchers displaced the touch of the back on the touch on the 
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back of the avatar. The participant feels the touch on their back and sees the touch on the 
avatar’s back. The result of this experiment found that synchronous stroking produces a strong 
illusion—the participant displaces their perceptions from their body to a different position in 
space, the avatar. If there is a delay between the two, this illusion will not work. 
This suggests that participants can identify with their avatar and that one’s center of 
awareness can be shifted into the direction of the avatar. Moreover, after this whole-body 
experiment participants were asked to estimate where they themselves were in the room and 
all participants made a systematic error forward, toward their virtual selves (Blanke and 
Metzinger, 2009). This suggests that there is dominance of the visual embodiment mechanism 
over the touch mechanism. This illusion is more than self-projection. It is not just a projection 
from the participant into the space or into the avatar, but a bi-directional change—there is also 
an impact of what they see on their body representation. Studying bodily ownership in virtual 
reality, then, is important for bodily self-consciousness research since it confirms what 
components and mechanisms are required for an individual to have a normal sense of self.  
  These studies show that body representation can flexibly incorporate body parts and 
whole bodies that are very different from an individual’s own body, even when this 
incorporation conflicts dramatically with stored knowledge about the body. These findings 
suggest that some form of “body model” serves as a perceptual filter, allowing certain types of 
stimuli to become incorporated while filtering out others. Although individuals know what their 
own bodies are like, the limits of bodily awareness appear to be set by a categorical 
representation of what human bodies are like in general. However, studies have found there 
are limitations, such as a rubber hand smaller in size than an individual’s real hand is not 
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embodied (Pavani and Zampini, 2007). That the smaller size of the rubber hand did not induce 
embodiment means that there are limitations to body plasticity.  
The SOSVR Experiment  
 
The aim of the experiment was to research whether self-motion and anatomical 
characteristics, such as biological sex, have a role in the visual representation of the self. To do 
this, I used virtual reality and two virtual avatars, which participants viewed from the third 
person perspective. The experiment assessed the role of biological sex and self-motion by 
presenting participants with pairs of avatars that visually represent their self, or another 
person. The avatar of the same sex was named the self avatar, while the avatar of the opposite 
sex was named the opposite avatar. These avatars also visually represent their self with 
coupled motion, and another person with decoupled motion, meaning the idle motion of an 
avatar that is swaying slightly from side to side. The opposite avatar was used to assess the role 
of the visual attributes of sex and motion. By manipulating sex and motion, I tested whether 
these aspects may have some role in how individuals perceive their self.  
Hypothesis 
 
I hypothesized that there would be a stronger consensus towards participants selecting 
the self avatar with normal motion when paired with the opposite avatar with decoupled 
motion than selecting the self avatar with decoupled motion when paired with an opposite 
avatar with normal motion. I made this hypothesis since self avatars and normal motion 
represent the normal functioning of the body image and body schema of the individual. If this is 
correct, then, participants should choose certain avatar pairing over others. 
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The visual representation of the self is important for one’s sense of self, since without it 
individuals will lose some degree of their sense of self. For instance, when individuals visualize 
themselves as a different sex, they likely will not associate or identify themselves to this avatar. 
Similarly, when individuals are not able to self-recognize their movements to the movements of 
an avatar, they will likely not self-recognize themselves to this avatar. Avatars with decoupled 
motion or of the opposite sex, then, may not be visually represented as the participant’s self.  
Procedure 
The SOSVR experiment was approved by the University of Waterloo's Research Ethics 
Committee, which complies with the Declaration of Helsinki. In the first stage of the 
experiment, nine Korean participants, aged 24-54 years old, were welcomed and instructed on 
the overall process of the study. Participants were then instructed to create a computer-
generated avatar of the same sex that most represents their self using Adobe Fuse Creative 
Cloud. This program has numerous available body parts for participants to choose from. I also 
had mirrors available for participants to adequately choose the corresponding body part in the 
program.  
The participant made their own virtual avatar of the same sex (self avatar), while a 
researcher created a virtual avatar of the opposite sex, matching the exact body, arms, legs, 
and face shape chosen for the self avatar (opposite avatar). The clothing used on the opposite 
avatar was also chosen to match the self avatar (Figure 1). This was done since resemblance of 
the avatar body to a human body improves embodiment into the avatar (Maselli and Slater, 
2013), and the feeling of presence in the virtual world (Eastin, 2006).  
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Additionally, although participants created their self avatar, this does not necessarily 
mean that they identified more with this customized avatar than the opposite avatars 
researchers created. Although virtual reality users have been shown to feel more connected 
and identify with an avatar that they created (Lim and Reeves, 2009), it has also been shown 
users identify with human-looking avatars even when they present different visual 
characteristics than their real selves. For instance, ownership can be induced over a body of a 








        Figure 1: Nine Self Avatars Created by Participants (Left Side) and Nine Opposite Avatars 
Created by Researchers (Right Side) 
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During the experiment, the participant was fitted with the VIVE virtual reality head 
mounted display (VRHMD). The VIVE VRHMD had the LEAP motion capture device mounted to 
the front to capture movement of the participants' hands. The Microsoft Kinnect motion 
capture device was used to capture movement of the participants' whole-body motion, while 
the LEAP motion was used to track the hands.  
The experiment had eight trial conditions, which mixed avatar type and motion to the 
left and right avatar (Table 2). Each condition was tested ten times for a total of eighty trials. On 
each trial, the participant was exposed to a realistic visual scene with 3D depth information that 
depicted the self avatar alongside either a self avatar or an opposite avatar, or two opposite 
avatars. Self motion was manipulated by assigning one of the avatars to have normal motion, 
like the participant’s movement using motion tracking, or alternatively, by adding different 
motion to participant movement to present realistic but decoupled motion. This means that the 
motion of the avatar was normal to the participant’s motion or decoupled—the idle motion of 
an avatar that is swaying slightly from side to side.  
Table 2: Experimental Conditions 
     
Condition Left Avatar Right Avatar Left Motion Right Motion 
1 "self" "self" normal  Decoupled 
2 "self" "self" Decoupled normal  
3 "other" "other" normal  Decoupled 
4 "other" "other" Decoupled normal  
5 "self" "other" normal  Decoupled 
6 "self" "other" Decoupled normal  
7 "other" "self" normal  decoupled 
8 "other" "self" Decoupled normal  
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Participants were encouraged to move around for up to ten seconds and attend to both 
avatars. At the end of each trial the participant was prompted by the VRHMD to answer the 
question "Which of the two avatars represents your self most, left or right?". Participants 
indicated their response by raising their arm and touching the index finger to the thumb of the 
same side of the avatar representing their self. During and after the experiment, participants 
were asked to report how they felt on a scale of one to twenty, with twenty being the highest 
sickness intensity. None of the participants reported a sickness score higher than five from 
using the virtual reality equipment. 
Results 
For each of the eight cells in the experimental design, participant response was 
averaged across all trials, creating a calculated scaled measure of sense of self. This calculated 
measure was then analyzed using Bayesian paired t-tests, to accommodate outliers.  
As Bayesian estimation for two groups can handle outliers by describing the data as 
heavy tailed distributions instead of normal distributions (Kass and Raftery, 1995), we 
performed a Bayesian paired t-test on the data between the self vs opposite avatar conditions 
(normal motion vs decoupled motion applied to the self avatar) using JASP v0.8.0.1. Here 
Bayes Factors (BF) provide a numerical value that quantifies how well a hypothesis (H1; self 
avatar with normal motion more likely than self avatar with decoupled motion) predicts the 
data relative to a competing null hypothesis (H0; no difference in likelihoods across conditions), 
where a BF10 between 0 and 1, indicates support for the H0, and a BF10 greater than 
1 indicates support for the H1.  
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Our results show support for the alternative hypothesis (H1) that despite an 
outlier participant being included, the average likelihood of selecting the self avatar with 
normal motion when paired with the opposite avatar with decoupled motion was higher than 
selecting the self avatar with decoupled motion when paired with an opposite avatar with 
normal motion (BF10 = 1.547; default Cauchy prior width = 0.707). A traditional t-test does not 
find a difference between these last two conditions. However, it is close with an outlier in the 
second last position. Using a Bayesian t-test that can handle outliers we find that there is more 
support for there being a difference between these last two conditions than there is not.                        
Discussion   
 
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 2. When comparing the self avatar 
with normal motion versus the self avatar with decoupled motion, participants were at chance 
(i.e., 50%) when identifying which of the two avatars most represented themselves. This 
suggests that changes in self-motion introduced in the experiment did not affect the sense of 
self when using the self avatar only. 
  When participants viewed two opposite avatars, where one had normal motion and 
the other with decoupled motion, participants were above chance at identifying with the avatar 
with normal motion over the avatar with decoupled motion. This suggests that the sense of self 
is affected by change in self-motion, but only when the visual representation of the body is 
different from the true self. 
When comparing the self avatar with the opposite avatar, participants are much more 
likely to select their self avatar over the opposite avatar, when normal motion is applied to the 
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self avatar. This suggests that participants identify more with the avatar when correct sex and 
motion are paired together.   
When normal motion is applied to the opposite avatar when paired with the self avatar 
with decoupled motion, participants go back to chance. This shows that sex and self-motion 
both have a role in this condition. If participants only used normal motion, then they would go 
with the opposite avatar. If they only go with sex, then they would pick their self avatar. But 
because they are at chance, the results show, by also using the results from the other 
















Figure 2: Average Percentage Response According to Each Category 
Listed on the X Axis 





What constitutes the sense of self? The purpose of this experiment was to research 
whether self-motion and biological sex are important attributes to the visual representation of 
the self. The results of the experiment suggest that both are important attributes to the visual 
representation of the self. When applied to my experiment, the sense of ownership and agency 
predict that when individuals perceive an opposite avatar or decoupled motion, this different 
visual representation of the self may have some negative effect on one’s conscious sense of 
personal identity in thought, motion, body, and emotion. When individuals do not have a 
coherent perception of themselves through time, individuals’ sense of self may be disrupted.     
The sense of agency is the sense of being the one who is causing an action or generating 
a thought, including the sense of being in control over own movements and thoughts (Blanke 
and Metzinger, 2009). It enables individuals to distinguish the actions that has been self-
generated from those that have been produced by another agent. In my experiment, if the 
participants noticed the decoupled motion of the avatar, this would possibly lead to these 
participants having a loss of the sense of agency and attributing the avatar to an external agent 
and not the self. However, this prediction was inconsistent in some trials, such as when 
comparing the self avatar with normal motion and the self avatar with decoupled motion. This 
trial suggests that changes in self-motion did not affect the sense of self when using the self 
avatar only.  
The sense of ownership is the experience that the body and bodily sensations belong to 
the individual and depends on an accurate integration of continuously changing body-related 
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multisensory information (Gallagher, 2000). Presenting conflicting multisensory information 
about the location or appearance of one’s body or body parts can temporally modify the sense 
of ownership. In my experiment, the sense of ownership seems to predict that when 
participants view an opposite avatar, that these participants will attribute this avatar to an 
external agent and not the self. This prediction seems to be consistent in the experiment since 
most of the trails confirmed it. The trial that could not confirm this prediction, which was not an 
inconsistency with the predication, was when two opposite avatars were being compared.  
 However, previous studies show that body representation can flexibly incorporate body 
parts and whole bodies that are very different from an individual’s own body, even when this 
incorporation conflicts dramatically with stored knowledge about the body. These findings 
suggest that some form of “body model” serves as a perceptual filter, allowing certain types of 
stimuli to become incorporated while filtering out others. Although individuals know what their 
own bodies are like, the limits of bodily awareness appear to be set by a categorical 
representation of what human bodies are like in general. This predicts that the opposite avatar 
will be attributed as the self. However, this prediction is inconsistent with some results, such as 
when the opposite avatar with normal motion is paired with the self avatar with decoupled 
motion, participants are at chance. If both sexes are attributed to the self, then the opposite 
avatar with normal motion should have been chosen. 
In the next two sections, I will discuss how the results of this experiment relate to both 
bodily awareness theories.  
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Representation Theory of Bodily Awareness 
 
Under the representational approach, due to different interpretations of body image 
and body schema, sex and motion may or may not be based on different underlying body 
representations. If sex and motion were based on different body representations, then, they 
would be differentially sensitive to the trials. Moreover, if both sex and motion were based on a 
single body representation, then the results should be highly correlated. But, as the results 
show, there is not always a correlation between sex and motion suggesting that these two 
aspects have different body representations. In fact, sex is part of the body image and schema. 
Although the experiment may not provide definitive evidence, it is consistent with the idea of 
dissociable underlying body representations for action and sex. Moreover, the results of the 
current study are consistent with the idea of a dissociation between at least two body 
representations, one used for action and one for perceptual judgements. Despite these results, 
the question concerning the nature of the two body representations remains.  
Sensorimotor Theory of Bodily Awareness 
 
Under the sensorimotor theory, perception is the activity of exploring the environment. 
Perceptual experience has two phenomenal features. First, sensory information changes as 
soon as one performs movement. This property, called “bodiliness” (O’Regan et al. 2005), 
explains the intimate quality of perceptual experience since sensory information is sensitive to 
body motions. The second feature is “grabbiness” (O’Regan et al. 2005), which consists of fast 
attention when there are sudden changes in the stimulation. A change in the visual field 
triggers a movement of the eye so that the fovea becomes lined up to the location of the 
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change. Thus, a visual variation is immediately recognized and analyzed. Grabbiness, then, 
makes all parts of the visual field very vivid and present—intimately related to us.  
Under this theory, the brain perceives an entity as one’s body part or whole-body if 
physical properties are sufficient to allow certain actions associated to that limb or full body. 
This claim is supported by some bodily self-consciousness studies, which illustrate that physical 
features are important to having a sense of self, and the transfer of embodiment and 
ownership to a body part or whole-body. In what follows, some of these studies will be related 
to the sensorimotor theory with its focus on sensorimotor functions.  
The RHI is possible with rubber hands of different color (Longo et al. 2009), texture 
(Haans et al. 2008), and gender since these features do not directly affect the limb’s proper 
functions. On the other hand, a wooden stick (Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005) or wooden slab 
(Guterstam et al. 2013) make functions impossible and as a result are likely not attributed as 
one's arm. Moreover, multiple rubber hands can be embodied at one time (Ehrsson, 2009) 
since it does not deteriorate hand functionality. Moreover, embodiment of limbs is also less 
sensitive to longer artificial arms (Kilteni et al., 2012) and larger rubber hands (Pavani and 
Zampini, 2007) since functionality is maintained. On the other hand, smaller rubber hands 
(Pavani and Zampini, 2007) do not keep functionality since the hands are to small to adequately 
perform tasks. Additionally, a cuboid with no limbs will not be attributed easily as one's body 
(Lenggenhager et al. 2007). On the other hand, the brain can embody avatars that afford these 
actions in the given environment, even when the avatars are non-human, or different in size 
and gender (Petkova and Ehrsson, 2008; Maister et al. 2014).  
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The sensorimotor theory also makes some predictions regarding the results of my 
virtual-reality experiment. Instead of passive stroking on the hand like in the RHI or the back as 
in the virtual reality whole-body illusion, the experiment required the participants to engage in 
active sensorimotor interactions, such as moving around in the environment. The sensorimotor 
theory predicts that when the avatars had decoupled motion, that the avatar’s limbs will not be 
perceived as properly functioning to the limb’s proper actions. Moreover, this theory predicts 
that the inability to properly reach a human arm out in the virtual environment at the same 
speed that one’s own bodily sensations are encoding, would likely lead to the brain not 
attributing the avatar as one’s body since the arm would appear to limit the limb’s proper 
functions, such as reaching. As a result, if the avatar’s motions are decoupled, there would 
likely not be the perception of the self towards the avatar. However, the experiment’s results 
were sometimes inconsistent with this prediction since self-motion did not always affect the 
results, such as when comparing the self avatar with normal motion and the self avatar with 
decoupled motion. Here, participants were at chance when identifying which of the two avatars 
most represented themselves. This result suggests that when the avatars are of the same sex, 
that decoupled motion did not affect their decision of their self.  
The sensorimotor approach also predicts that the opposite avatar will not affect the 
attribution of the opposite avatar to the self since sex does not affect the participants’ actions 
in the environment. However, this prediction is inconsistent with some results, such as when 
the opposite avatar with normal motion is paired with the self avatar with decoupled motion, 
participants are at chance. If both sexes are not attributed to the self, then the opposite avatar 
with normal motion should have been chosen. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
 
The sensorimotor theory’s predictions are consistent with its focus on sensorimotor 
functions. Whereas the sensorimotor theory does not have sex as an important factor to bodily 
awareness, my experiment’s results suggest that sex is an important factor to the visual 
representation of the self. However, my experiment’s results may also reflect certain limitations 
of my experiment, such as participant biases, the small sample size of nine participants, and not 
having an option in the trials for when the participant did not think either avatar represents 
their self. For future experiments, then, addressing these limitations would be beneficial to 
explaining what role and how strong of a role sensorimotor functions have on the visual 
representation of the self.  
Even with these limitations, future research could use my experiment as a starting point 
for cross-cultural research. If individuals locate the self differently depending on their culture 
(Adam et al. 2015), then, certain cultures might, for instance, view certain aspects of this 
experiment, such as being an opposite avatar differently. This may lead to bias towards one 
avatar over the other. Future research, then, may want to compare the experiment’s results to 
other cultures. 
Another area for future research is to directly study whether participants feel or 
perceive themselves as embodied in the avatar. Although some argue that the first-person 
perspective is the most suitable condition to induce a high sense of embodiment (Maselli and 
Slater, 2013), others do not observe significant differences between the two viewpoint modes 
(Debarba et al., 2015). Moreover, that the avatar was positioned in congruence and mirroring 
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the participant’s actual body posture that is seen and felt (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009) allows 
for the possibility of embodiment to the avatar. Otherwise, when using a third-person 
perspective, if the avatar is not in this position the brain does not integrate the avatar as self. If 
the brain does not integrate, then the participant will not feel embodied in the avatar and that 
the avatar is their self. This means there is a possibility that participants felt embodied in the 
avatar that most represents their self. But to directly study embodiment with, for instance 
questionnaires after the experiment, would be beneficial.  
A problem, however, with studying embodiment is that a large part of the self is 
grounded in low level embodiment such as gut feelings, inner organ perception, the sense of 
weight, heart rate, and the vestibular sense. Moreover, these experimental paradigms only 
study the judgment of ownership or reflective and belief-like processes, and not the sense of 
ownership. The sense of ownership is characterized by lower-level, pre-reflective, sensorimotor 
processes.  
One such recent experiment is the cardio-visual version of the rubber hand illusion 
(Suzuki et al. 2013), which studied the effects of a heart rate on the sense of self. Participants 
wore a head mounted display through which they saw a virtual-reality version of their own 
hand projected in front of them, while their real hand remained hidden out of view. The virtual 
hand was made to pulse to red and back either in-time or out-of-time with their heartbeat. The 
researchers found that the virtual hand was more likely to be experienced as part of a person’s 
body when the ‘cardio-visual’ feedback was aligned with the actual heartbeat, than when it was 
misaligned. This shows that the brain integrates its perception of the body from the outside 
with its perception from the inside in determining what is experienced as its body. For future 
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experiments, then, measures of the eye movements, heart rate, motor potentials, and brain 
activity may better access the feeling of ownership. For instance, within our experiment, the 
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